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Bet you are tired of being upset 
Always wanting something you never can get 
Life’s no illusion, love’s not a dream 
Now, I know just what it is 
Everybody’s happy nowadays.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At least apocryphally, when Salvador Dali first saw Joseph Cornell’s iconic 
collage film Rose Hobart, he exclaimed, “He stole it from my subconscious!”2 I 
 
 *  Spears-Gilbert Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky School of Law. J.D., 
New York University School of Law, 2005; M.F.A., San Francisco Art Institute, 1997; B.A, 
University of California, Berkeley, 1995. 
 1.  Buzzcocks, Everybody’s Happy Nowadays, on SINGLES GOING STEADY (United Artists 
Records 1979). 
 2. Robert Leonard, Joseph Cornell: Blue Movie, CITY GALLERY WELLINGTON (Nov. 1, 2017) 
https://citygallery.org.nz/blog/blue-movie. 
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had a similar response when I read Dave Fagundes’s amusingly iconoclastic 
article, Why Less Property Is More: Inclusion, Dispossession & Subjective Well-Being.3 
Its premise is shocking, but also seductively familiar. 
In a nutshell, Fagundes argues that property is making us miserable, and 
we should get rid of it.4 Hedonics or “happiness studies” scholarship suggests 
that owning property often does not increase happiness and may actually 
decrease happiness.5 In a previous article, Buying Happiness, Fagundes used 
hedonics to argue that people should be wary of acquiring too much property, 
and the government should avoid encouraging property ownership.6 Why Less 
Property Is More expands on that insight, using hedonics to argue that people 
should share or give away much of their property, and the government should 
help them.  
I find Fagundes’s premise broadly compelling. Community and altruism 
are associated with happiness, while isolation and selfishness are not. If the 
purpose of government is to increase net welfare, then governments should 
encourage community and altruism in order to increase happiness. 
But, as always, the devil is in the details. While hedonics provides many 
helpful insights, I wonder whether it is really capable of doing as much work 
as it claims. It is one thing to provide a framework for an academic study, and 
another thing entirely to provide a basis for government action. Maybe 
hedonics should inform policy, without necessarily driving it? I also wonder 
whether increasing individual happiness always increases net happiness. Is all 
happiness made the same, or can happiness be a zero-sum game? Should we 
worry about the distribution of happiness? And I wonder about some of the 
policy changes that Fagundes suggests. How can we predict and measure their 
effectiveness? 
II. LESS IS MORE: A HEDONIC PERSPECTIVE ON PROPERTY 
As Fagundes observes, “The twin notions of possession and exclusion lie 
at the center of our cultural and legal understanding of property.”7 The law 
abhors a vacuum. So property law assumes that everything belongs to 
someone, and that ownership means exclusion. For better or worse, William 
Blackstone’s definition of property as “that . . . despotic dominion which one 
man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total 
exclusion of any other individual in the universe” remains as canonical today 
as the day it was uttered.8 
 
 3. Dave Fagundes, Why Less Property Is More: Inclusion, Dispossession, & Subjective Well-Being, 
103 IOWA L. REV. 1361 (2018).  
 4. See generally id.  
 5. Id. at 1366. 
 6. David Fagundes, Buying Happiness: Property, Acquisition, and Subjective Well-Being, 58 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1851, 1856–57 (2017). 
 7. Fagundes, supra note 3, at 1362.  
 8. Id. at 1364 (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *1–2).  
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But the rights to possess and exclude imply the rights to dispose and 
include. If you own something, you can give it away, and if you can exclude 
someone, you can also include them. And yet, property law has largely ignored 
disposal and inclusion, despite research suggesting that they can generate 
more individual welfare than ownership and exclusion.9 It turns out that 
donating and sharing property often makes people happier than keeping it 
for themselves.10 Accordingly, Fagundes argues that the government should 
encourage people to donate and share property, when it is likely to increase 
their welfare.11 
He begins with the “uncontroversial” claim that the government should 
try to increase net social welfare.12 Measuring social welfare directly is hard, 
so economists typically encourage the government to measure it in dollars 
and cents and try to maximize wealth.13 While wealth is an imperfect proxy 
for welfare, it is better than nothing. Money doesn’t always make people 
happy, but it rarely makes them sad. If the government makes people richer, 
the odds are good it will make them happier as well.  
But what if we could measure welfare itself? Fagundes claims that “recent 
advances in the nascent field of hedonics” or “happiness studies” may enable 
us to make policy based on welfare, rather than wealth.14 Hedonics aims to 
measure welfare by asking people whether they are happy.15 Some hedonics 
scholars measure “affective” or “moment-by-moment” happiness, while others 
measure “life satisfaction.”16 While Fagundes prefers the former method, he 
acknowledges that both have their merits. .17 
In any case, Fagundes argues that hedonics can accurately and reliably 
tell us when people are happy and when they are not.18 By extension, hedonics 
can also tell the government how a policy choice will affect net welfare.19 It 
follows that the government should use hedonics to inform policy choices, 
because it provides a more accurate metric than wealth.20 
Specifically, Fagundes observes that hedonics research undermines the 
traditional equation of property and welfare.21 The law assumes that 
 
 9. See id. at 1372–73. 
 10. Id. at 1373.  
 11. Id. at 1379–80. 
 12. Id. at 1368 (“Few would disagree with the claim that governments should pass laws that 
make affected citizens better off.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS  
& PUB. POL’Y 85, 86–89 (1985). 
 14. Fagundes, supra note 3, at 1368.  
 15. Id. at 1368–69. 
 16. Id. at 1369.  
 17. Id. at 1370 n.42, 1374 n.62. 
 18. Id. at 1370. 
 19. Id. at 1371–72. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at 1372. 
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ownership makes us happy: “The name’s Mo Rutherford. They call me that 
‘cause when people give me money, I always want mo’.”22 But hedonics says 
otherwise.23 Often, ownership and exclusion not only fail to increase 
individual welfare, but actually decrease it.24 By contrast, disposal and sharing 
typically increase individual welfare: “Love is something, if you give it away, 
you end up having more.”25 
In other words, the popular saying “greed is good” may have it 
backward.26 Hedonics suggests that sharing and caring make us happy, and 
that selfishness and isolation make us sad.27 
Okay, so what? Well, if Fagundes is right, it changes everything. If the 
purpose of government is to increase net social welfare, and the best way to 
increase individual welfare is the disposal and sharing of property, then maybe 
we should rethink property law from scratch. Rather than encourage people 
to get property, the government should encourage them to give it away. 
Specifically, hedonics suggests that charity most effectively increases 
happiness when it is voluntary, personal, and concrete.28 In other words, 
charity makes people happy when they want to give, they know the person 
who receives the gift, and they can see the positive impact it makes.29 
Essentially, charity makes us happy because it increases social connections, 
which make us happy.  
However, Fagundes also observes that “charitable donation can make 
people feel wealthier even as it reduces their actual wealth” because “acting 
magnanimously makes people feel not only charitable, but powerful, and 
reminds them of their wealth status in the world relative to the more needy.”30 
Likewise, sharing makes us happy, because it promotes social bonds.31 Of 
course, some sharing is simply a form of altruism. But even non-altruistic, 
commercial “sharing” of the kind facilitated by the “sharing economy” can 
increase happiness, by enabling and encouraging people to form social bonds 
they otherwise might not: “the very act of participation in the sharing 
economy can generate a sense of connectedness.”32 
 
 22. THE STUFF (New World Pictures 1985) (statement of David “Mo” Rutherford). 
 23. Fagundes, supra note 3, at 1372–73. 
 24. Id. 
 25. MALVINA REYNOLDS, Love Is Something (Magic Penny), on MALVINA REYNOLDS SINGS THE 
TRUTH (Columbia Records) (1967). 
 26. WALL STREET (American Entertainment Partners 1987). 
 27. Fagundes, supra note 3, at 1372–73. 
 28. Id. at 1402. 
 29. Id. at 1373–75. 
 30. Id. at 1374.  
 31. Id. at 1375. 
 32. Id. at 1387. 
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III. HEDONICS IN ACTION 
So, how can the government use hedonics to improve policy and make 
people happier? Fagundes acknowledges that it cannot simply force people 
to give away or share their property.33 While voluntary giving increases 
happiness, involuntary giving does not, and may even decrease happiness.34 
Charity makes people happy, but taxes do not.35 Likewise, sharing makes 
people happy, but trespassing and theft do not.36 
But the government can adopt policies that encourage altruism and 
community, and thereby increase happiness. Charity law can encourage 
altruism and shape the social meaning of charitable donations. Property law 
can encourage the disposal of property, or at least stop encouraging 
acquisition. And regulatory law can encourage the sharing economy, or at 
least stop discouraging it. 
Fagundes argues that charity law could increase happiness by limiting or 
eliminating the charitable contribution deduction and replacing it with a 
direct subsidy to charitable donations.37 He bases this seemingly 
counterintuitive proposal on the observation that the hedonic benefits of 
altruism are diminished or eliminated by self-interest.38 Accordingly, while the 
charitable contribution deduction may encourage donations motivated by 
self-interest, it may also discourage donations motivated by altruism and 
reduce the happiness those donations would otherwise generate.39 
In theory, the “libertarian” approach of eliminating the charitable 
contribution deduction entirely could increase the happiness generated by 
altruistic donations, including the many low-income donors who cannot claim 
the tax deduction anyway.40 And the effect on overall donations might be 
small.41 Many high-income donors are also motivated by altruism, and the 
charitable contribution deduction might not always be a salient factor.42 
But Fagundes seems to prefer a “libertarian-paternalist” approach based 
on “nudging” people to make donations.43 Specifically, he proposes direct 
subsidies for charitable donations in the form of a matching grant.44 This 
could eliminate the self-interest problem that may reduce or eliminate the 
hedonic benefits associated with altruism, and it might also enable the 
 
 33. Id. at 1375, 1379. 
 34. Id. at 1379. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See id. 
 37. Id. at 1395–97, 1403. 
 38. Id. at 1396–97. 
 39. See id. 
 40. Id. at 1398–99. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. at 1399.  
 43. See id. at 1399–403, 1408–10.  
 44. Id. at 1409–10. 
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government to increase the efficiency of charitable subsidies by calibrating 
them to maximize return.45 The government could also limit the charitable 
contribution deduction to very large charitable contributions, when it is more 
likely to be salient.46 
Fagundes also argues that property law could increase happiness by 
facilitating and encouraging the disposal of property.47 Currently, property 
law is designed to encourage people to acquire real and personal property.48 
But hedonics suggests that ownership of property may actually make people 
unhappy, especially when they go into debt in order to acquire it.49 In 
particular, Fagundes highlights the appeal of “minimalism.”50 People who 
own “tiny houses” or limit their personal possessions often claim increased 
happiness, and renters seem to be just as happy as homeowners.51 
Accordingly, Fagundes argues that the government could increase 
happiness by discouraging the acquisition of real and personal property, or at 
least not encouraging it.52 For example, the government could eliminate 
policies that encourage people to acquire property and to devote more 
resources to the acquisition of property than they would otherwise.53 In 
particular, Fagundes argues that the government should eliminate the 
mortgage tax deduction, which creates a tax incentive for people to buy a 
home, rather than renting, and encourages them to incur additional 
mortgage debt.54 The government could further encourage the dispossession 
of property by directly subsidizing donations of property to charitable 
organizations.55 And it could discourage the acquisition of property, especially 
excessive property, by legitimizing or even subsidizing “minimalist” housing, 
or imposing a tax on large homes.56 
In addition, Fagundes argues that regulatory law could increase 
happiness by facilitating and encouraging sharing of various kinds.57 
Hedonics suggests that sharing property makes people happy because it 
facilitates the development of social bonds.58 Non-commercial sharing is a 
familiar aspect of friendship, but even commercial “sharing” can encourage 
 
 45. See id. 
 46. Id. at 1400–01. 
 47. See id. at 1377–78; 1403–08. 
 48. See id. at 1364. 
 49. Id. at 1406–08. 
 50. See id. at 1403–08. 
 51. Id. at 1372 n.58, 1406–07. 
 52. See id. at 1373, 1408–16. 
 53. See id. at 1409–10. 
 54. See id. at 1410. 
 55. Id. at 1409–10. 
 56. Id. at 1410–13. 
 57. Id. at 1390–94. 
 58. Id. at 1375–76. 
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the creation of social bonds that increase happiness.59 Currently, regulatory 
law typically ignores most non-commercial sharing of property, but governs 
and sometimes prohibits commercial sharing.60 In particular, the new 
“sharing economy” is often controversial, and the subject of regulatory 
intervention that discourages or even prohibits sharing.61 Fagundes argues 
that the government should encourage the kinds of non-commercial sharing 
that are most likely to increase happiness, and that it should not discriminate 
against commercial sharing, which may also increase happiness.62 If inclusion 
tends to make people happy, the government should avoid imposing 
regulatory hurdles and, instead, should focus on protecting safety and 
preventing fraud.63 
IV. A QUALIFIED ENDORSEMENT OF HEDONIC POLICYMAKING 
There is a lot to like about Fagundes’s premise. If you believe that 
utilitarianism is a true moral theory, then the government should try to 
increase “happiness,” however it is defined. The real question is how best to 
achieve that goal, and how best to measure success. While wealth is a 
reasonable proxy for happiness, if hedonics can measure happiness directly, 
all the better. In any case, Fagundes is right that property is—or should be—
only a means of increasing happiness, not an end in itself.64 
It is surely true that community and altruism contribute to happiness. 
When property rights discourage or prevent community and altruism, those 
rights probably reduce net happiness and should be changed. And it may very 
well be the case that the law could more effectively promote community and 
altruism. For example, as I have previously observed, the success of altruistic 
crowdfunding suggests that existing charity law fails to solve many “charity 
failures” or inefficiencies in charitable giving.65  
But I am skeptical of Fagundes’s suggestion that the government should 
start focusing on maximizing happiness, as defined by hedonics, rather than 
maximizing wealth.66 To begin with, I am not convinced that “happiness 
studies” are really ready for primetime.67 While those studies have produced 
many interesting and valuable observations and provided many helpful 
insights, I doubt that they have the degree of certainty and predictability 
required for effective policy implementation. 
 
 59. See id. at 1391–92. 
 60. See id. at 1380–82. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See id. at 1391–92. 
 63. See id. at 1393–94. 
 64. See id. at 1373. 
 65. See generally Brian L. Frye, Solving Charity Failures, 93 OR. L. REV. 155 (2014) (explaining 
theory of charity failures and how crowdfunding may solve some of them). 
 66. See Fagundes, supra note 3, at 1375. 
 67. See id. at 1368–72. 
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Traditional cost-benefit analysis has been around for a long time and 
relies on a limited number of fairly well-defined variables.68 And yet, its results 
are often highly variable and disputed.69 By contrast, hedonics relies on a vast 
number of poorly defined and difficult to measure variables.70 Indeed, 
hedonics does not even provide a non-circular definition of “happiness.”71 
Even if we assume that actual happiness corresponds to self-assessments of 
happiness, it doesn’t tell us what we are measuring or whether everyone is 
measuring it the same way. And what if people cannot accurately self-assess 
their actual happiness? How would we know? 
Obviously, people are not actually rational economic actors, and are 
often not even perfect judges of their own subjective preferences. Behavioral 
economics has convincingly shown that people often make irrational 
decisions that are inconsistent with their expressed preferences and decrease 
their welfare.72 
But the best should not be the enemy of the good. The “de gustibus” 
principle that the government should try to help people satisfy their subjective 
preferences is a truism of neoclassical economics for a good reason.73 People 
do not have to be perfect judges of their preferences in order for the principle 
to work, they only have to be better than the government. 
The premise of hedonics is not just that people sometimes make bad 
choices that reduce their subjective happiness, but that hedonics can enable 
the government to make better choices on their behalf.74 But historically, the 
government has often failed to predict individual preferences as accurately as 
individuals predict their own preferences.75 The data is hard to gather, and 
even harder to process.76 It seems more than a little premature to assume that 
hedonics will be more successful. Not to mention that even the ability to 
identify happiness-maximizing policies does not guarantee their adoption. 
In any case, the problem is that hedonics compares a theoretically 
possible happiness-maximizing policy to actual policies supposedly intended 
to increase wealth. Of course, a theoretically perfect policy will outperform 
any actual policy. But we should be comparing like with like, and only 
consider policies we can actually realize. If our goal is to maximize actual 
 
 68. See, e.g., FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT vii (1921) (“There is little 
that is fundamentally new in this book.”).  
 69. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow & Robert C. Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public 
Investment Decisions, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 364, 364 (1970). 
 70. See id.  
 71. See id. at 1369. 
 72. See id. at 1397. 
 73. But see generally George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 
AM. ECON. REV. 76 (1977) (arguing that most people have similar preferences). 
 74. See Fagundes, supra note 3, at 1370–72. 
 75. See, e.g., F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519–20 
(1945). 
 76. See id. 
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happiness, we should ask whether hedonics or wealth will better inform policy 
right now. 
In practice, a hedonic policy is preferable to a wealth policy only if 
hedonics can actually deliver better results. I am not sure it can, for both 
technical and political reasons. For one thing, despite the many studies cited 
by Fagundes, I am not convinced that happiness is sufficiently well-defined or 
its etiology sufficiently well-understood to enable the government to 
confidently predict the effect of policy on happiness any more accurately than 
the effect of wealth on happiness. And for another, I suspect that 
“unhappiness” itself is often a form of “luxury good.” Hedonics relies on self-
reported happiness, either in the moment, or long term.77 But suppose some 
people have a preference for unhappiness? Why assume that reported 
happiness necessarily reflects actual happiness? 
Moreover, it seems unlikely that happiness is monocausal. While monks 
and nuns may report high levels of happiness caused by communality and 
sharing,78 there is good reason to believe that others would experience low 
levels of happiness under the same circumstances. Certainly, few people 
voluntarily choose an ascetic lifestyle. If doing so would truly produce high 
levels of happiness in all or most, that is quite the secret hidden in plain sight. 
V. HEDONIC POLICY & ITS DISCONTENTS 
Let us assume that hedonics can tell us what is likely to make at least some 
people happy, at least sometimes. That seems like a plausible claim, and one 
worthy of consideration. How might we put it to use? 
Fagundes suggests some ways that the government could use hedonics to 
shape policy. Most convincingly, he points to the mortgage interest deduction 
as a policy that encourages people to take on additional debt to buy larger 
houses than they actually want, both of which are likely to decrease 
happiness.79 He suggests that the government should eliminate the mortgage 
interest deduction, or even subsidize smaller houses or non-
homeownership.80 
Few scholars would defend the mortgage interest deduction. And 
hedonics provides an additional reason to question its wisdom. Eliminating 
the mortgage interest deduction is good policy for any number of reasons, 
not least because it is expensive, regressive, and inefficient.81 If eliminating it 
is likely to increase happiness as well as reduce those problems, all the better. 
 
 77. Fagundes, supra note 3, at 1369. 
 78. Id. at 1376. 
 79. Id. at 1408–09. 
 80. Id. At 1409–16. 
 81. See, e.g., Andrew Chamberlain, The Case Against the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, TAX 
FOUNDATION (Sept. 24, 2005), https://taxfoundation.org/case-against-home-mortgage-interest-
deduction (“Despite the political popularity of the tax deduction for home mortgage interest, 
economists are basically united in their opposition to it.”). 
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But I wonder whether creating a new subsidy to encourage alternative 
housing decisions is a good idea or will increase net happiness. For one thing, 
subsidies targeted at encouraging “sustainable” practices have a dismaying 
tendency to become subsidies for the lifestyle choices of the wealthy, at the 
cost of the public fisc.82 And for another, the happiness associated with 
owning a small house may not increase net public welfare, but only be a 
“happiness transfer.” 
Yes, the “small house” trend is popular. But why? Would renting or 
owning a small house make everyone happier? And why do small houses make 
people happy? Is it only because owning a small house reduces the burden of 
labor and debt? Or is it also because owning a small house is associated with 
virtue and generates happiness by increasing the relative social status of the 
small house owner? 
Furthermore, I am skeptical of the happiness research showing that 
people derive no hedonic benefits from owning a home. A few survey studies 
are not enough to counter the evidence of the actual choices and policy 
demands made by actual people. For better or worse, the mortgage interest 
deduction did not create the desire to own a home but the other way around. 
If homeownership makes some people happy, then creating a disincentive or 
subsidizing non-ownership could make people less happy. And what of the 
landlords? Even if it turns out that everyone really wants to rent, someone still 
has to own and manage the real estate. 
Fagundes also suggests that the charitable contribution deduction may 
reduce or eliminate happiness gains from otherwise altruistic donations 
because donors receive a tax deduction in exchange for their contributions 
and suggests that this weakness could be eliminated if the government 
promised to provide a subsidy to accompany every charitable contribution.83 
As a policy matter, this is a strange suggestion. A charitable contribution 
deduction literally is just an indirect subsidy provided by the government.84 
And, at least according to one theory, taxpayers do not actually receive 
anything in exchange for charitable contributions, they simply do not pay 
taxes on income they do not consume.85 In other words, if a taxpayer’s 
marginal rate is 25%, a $100 donation actually costs the taxpayer $75, and 
the government provides an indirect subsidy of $25.86 Presumably, if there 
were no charitable contribution deduction, the same taxpayer would 
 
 82. See, e.g., Severin Borenstein & Lucas Davis, The Distributional Effects of U.S. Clean Energy 
Tax Credits, 30 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 191, 191–92 (2016). 
 83. Fagundes, supra note 3, at 1394–403. 
 84. See 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2012). 
 85. See, e.g., ADAM PARACHIN, THE CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS DEDUCTION: A TAX DEBATE 
OR A QUESTION OF CHARITY VERSUS GOVERNMENT? 7–8 (2013) https://www.urban.org/sites/ 
default/files/the-charitable-contributions-deduction-a-tax-debate-or-a-question-of-charity-versus-
government.pdf 
 86. See 26 U.S.C. § 170. 
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contribute $75. A $25 contribution from the government would produce 
exactly the same result. Fagundes suggests that the government might be able 
to achieve the same effect with a smaller direct subsidy.87 While that would be 
great for the public fisc, it seems irrelevant to the happiness calculation. 
Presumably, the point of the proposal is that actual taxpayers have a 
different hedonic response depending on whether the government 
characterizes its subsidy of charitable contributions as a tax deduction or a 
grant to the organization. While that may very well be true, it is not obviously 
the case. Do taxpayers really derive no hedonic benefit from tithing? Surely 
taxpayers are well-aware that the deduction does not make their charitable 
contributions free. Most charities seem to think that the deduction is a 
significant incentive for individuals to make more and larger donations.88 And 
in any case, the government could solve the problem by simply characterizing 
the deduction as a government subsidy to the charity, rather than a tax rebate. 
While there is some evidence of hypersalience, the charitable contribution 
deduction is not available to the majority of taxpayers, who do not itemize, 
and yet contribute anyway.89  
Fortuitously, both of Fagundes’s hypotheses90 will soon be tested in a 
natural experiment, as the recent tax reform comes into effect for the 2018 
tax season. With the increase in the standard deduction, the mortgage interest 
deduction will no longer apply to many taxpayers.91 Will it affect their decision 
whether to buy a house and which house to buy? Likewise, to the horror of 
many charities, the charitable contribution deduction will apply to even fewer 
taxpayers than before. Will it affect charitable contributions or how much 
happiness donors derive from those contributions? Only time will tell. 
VI. HEDONIC COPYRIGHT 
While Fagundes offers several examples of how hedonics could inform 
property law,92 can we apply hedonics to other kinds of property? For 
example, can hedonics tell us anything about intellectual property, 
specifically copyright? While scholars offer many different justifications for 
real and personal property, from a utilitarian perspective property is just a 
means to an end. Ultimately, property is justified when it increases net social 
 
 87. Fagundes, supra note 3, at 1394–403. 
 88. See Alan Viard, We Should Allow All Taxpayers to Deduct Charitable Contributions, HILL (June 
19, 2018, 12:00 PM) http://thehill.com/opinion/finance/392991-we-should-allow-all-
taxpayers-to-deduct-charitable-contributions. 
 89. See generally Lilian V. Faulhaber, The Hidden Limits of the Charitable Deduction: An 
Introduction to Hypersalience, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1307 (2012) (explaining hypersalience and its 
interaction with the charitable deduction). 
 90. Fagundes, supra note 3, at 1395–97, 1403–08. 
 91. Prashant Gopal & Joe Light, 25 Million Americans Could Find Mortgage Tax Break Useless 
Under Trump’s Plan, BLOOMBERG (May 16, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2017-05-16/trump-tax-plan-would-make-mortgage-break-worthless-for-millions.  
 92. Fagundes, supra note 3, at 1382–90. 
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welfare and unjustified when it does not. Conveniently, copyright is explicitly 
utilitarian.93 At least in theory, the government grants copyright protection to 
authors not because they have a natural right to it or morally deserve it, but 
because granting copyright increases net social welfare.94 
At first glance, copyright seems inconsistent with Fagundes’ argument 
that property makes us happiest when we share it or give it away. Most authors 
get quite incensed by copyright infringement and analogous uses of their 
works, including plagiarism.95 This should be surprising given that works of 
authorship are almost costless to share and give away. Unlike real and 
personal property, which by definition are scarce and therefore rivalrous, 
works of authorship are non-rivalrous. If someone uses or takes your real or 
personal property without permission, they have deprived you of the use of 
that property. But it is impossible to “take” a work of authorship, and the use 
of a work of authorship does not diminish the supply of that work. Why aren’t 
authors indifferent or even happy when people use their works of authorship? 
Maybe the problem is consent. As Fagundes observes, sharing and 
altruism only increase happiness when they are voluntary.96 So, maybe authors 
object to copyright infringement and plagiarism primarily or exclusively 
because they amount to involuntary sharing. After all, infringers and 
plagiarists rarely ask for permission. 
Notably, most authors are happy to license their works, at least under 
some circumstances, and many are even willing to license their works for less 
than the market-clearing price, at least for uses they approve.97 Indeed, 
Creative Commons, the open access movement, and “copyleft” are essentially 
altruistic efforts to share or “give away” copyrighted works.98 
At least anecdotally, authors even seem more willing to license their 
works than their heirs, who do not necessarily derive much actual happiness 
from hoarding their inherited copyrights.99 And corporate owners are often 
 
 93. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 214 (2003) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 
219 (1954)) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant 
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain 
is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science 
and useful Arts.’”). 
 94. See id. 
 95. See, e.g., Jonathan Bailey, The Emotional Toll of Plagiarism, ITHENTICATE (Apr. 6, 2016, 
11:30:41 AM) http://www.ithenticate.com/plagiarism-detection-blog/the-emotional-toll-of-plagiarism. 
 96. Id. at 1379. 
 97. See, e.g., RESEARCHGATE https://www.researchgate.net (last visited Aug. 5, 2018) 
(allowing users to request articles that normally require subscriptions directly from authors). 
 98. See Drew Cullen, Copyleft Puts the Open Source into Geek Chic, REGISTER (Jan. 10, 2000) 
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2000/01/10/copyleft_puts_the_open_source; Creative Commons 
and Open Access, CREATIVE COMMONS https://wiki.creativecommons.org/wiki/Creative_ 
Commons_and_Open_Access (last visited July 29, 2018). 
 99. See, e.g., Andrew Gilden, IP, R.I.P., 95 WASH. U.L. REV. 639, 651–52 (2017) (describing 
the way in which Stephen Joyce hoards his grandfather James Joyce’s intellectual property). 
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most willing to license their copyrighted works, albeit rarely at below-market 
rates.100 
However, there is one aspect of copyright ownership that most authors 
demand. And ironically, it is a form of ownership that the Copyright Act does 
not actually give most of them: attribution.101 While many authors are happy 
to countenance the use of their works of authorship, vanishingly few are 
willing to forego attribution.102 
Indeed, creative communities almost inevitably develop robust 
plagiarism norms intended to create and enforce attribution rights not 
granted by the Copyright Act.103 In other words, artists collectively create a 
property right they value, but that the government doesn’t provide. And the 
vigor with which they police and enforce that right is remarkable.104 
Perhaps plagiarism norms are aggressively enforced precisely because 
copyright does not include an attribution right. Property rights enforced in 
the shadow of the law are often especially brutish, precisely because they lack 
the authority of the state.105 
But an alternative, arguably uglier, explanation presents itself. Perhaps 
creative communities function as cartels and use plagiarism norms to 
maximize the happiness of their members by punishing outsiders and 
defectors. Or, to put it another way, perhaps authorial ownership generates 
happiness not only via altruism, but also—perhaps primarily?—via status. 
VII. ZERO-SUM HEDONICS? 
Happiness has many different mothers. Sometimes, happiness is caused 
by feelings of altruism.106 But other times, happiness is caused by feelings of 
superiority.107 
 
 100. See, e.g., Spectacular Images. Flexible Pricing., GETTY IMAGES, https://www.gettyimages.com 
(providing pricing plans allowing consumers to purchase stock photos) (last visited Aug. 5, 2018). 
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Of course, from the subjective perspective of the individual, happiness is 
happiness! If altruism makes one person happy and superiority makes 
another person happy, they are both happy. But do both forms of happiness 
have the same social value? Should the government encourage both forms of 
happiness? Happiness caused by altruistic acts seems to have a strong potential 
of being mutually beneficial. But happiness caused by a sense of superiority 
seems more likely to be a form of zero-sum exchange. If the happiness of one 
person comes at the expense of another, is that really a form of happiness we 
want to encourage? Indeed, if it causes a net reduction in happiness, might it 
be a form of happiness we wish to discourage? 
For example, people experience happiness as a result of consuming 
branded goods, but they may experience less happiness if they perceive the 
possibility of consuming other similar, competing, but less desirable goods.108 
This is probably true. But is it a form of happiness we should encourage? In 
particular, is it a kind of happiness that we should encourage at the expense 
of those who might prefer to consume a less expensive competitor of a 
branded product? 
These observations obviously invoke Thorstein Veblen’s hoary critique of 
“conspicuous consumption,” the idea that people compete for social status—
and presumably individual happiness!—by publicly demonstrating their 
wealth and ability to consume vast quantities of expensive goods.109 Veblen 
and his progeny have long scolded this behavior, ostensibly on the ground 
that it is wasteful, but more truthfully, because it is unseemly.110 We disapprove 
of this form of vanity as improper—or at least claim as much! 
But is the converse also true? Might “minimalism” be a form of 
“conspicuous nonconsumption”? And if it is, should it be the kind of behavior 
that we encourage or discourage? I do not think I am alone in detecting a hint 
of smugness in the virtuous proclamations of the apostles of minimalism. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In sum, I found Fagundes’s article illuminating and provocative. His core 
insight, that hedonics can and should inform property policy is both novel 
and almost certainly true. Unsurprisingly, the details of how to actually 
accomplish that goal may still need some finessing. I look forward to reading 
future articles expanding on these valuable ideas.  
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